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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), § 63-46b16 (Supp. 1988), and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from the Orders of the Utah State Tax
Commission (the "Commission"), dated March 28, 1991, which remanded
the controversy to the Uintah County Board of Equalization for
future proceedings; specifically, to adduce additional evidence to
establish the fair market value of the real property which is the
subject matter of this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Orders from which appeal is taken in this matter are based
upon the Commission's finding that there was insufficient factual
evidence from which the Commission could make a determination
concerning the fair market value of the subject property.

In that

this finding is implicitly based upon the Commission expertise in
the areas of taxation and appraisal methodology, as applied to the
facts adduced in evidence, deference should be given to the
Commission's ruling and the appropriate standard of review is one
of "reasonableness and rationality".

RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 2:
(1) All tangible property in the State,
not exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this Constitution, shall be
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 3:
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law
a uniform and equal rate of assessment and
taxation on all tangible property in the
state, according to its value in money, except
as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this
Article. The Legislature shall prescribe by
law such provisions as shall secure a just
valuation for taxation of such property, so
that every person and corporation shall pay a
tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or
its tangible property, provided that the
Legislature may determine the manner and
extent of taxing livestock.
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes
may, as the Legislature prescribes, be assessed according to its value for agricultural
use without regard to the value it may have
for other purposes.
Utah Code, § 63-46b-16(4):
The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or
rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
BTP10.002
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(b) the agency has acted beyond the
jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of
the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the person taking the agency action
were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion
delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary

to

a

rule

of

the

agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency,s prior
practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by given facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious •

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from Orders of the Commission, remanding the
BTP10.002
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underlying controversy to the Uintah Board of Equalization for
further proceedings to adduce evidence concerning the fair market
value of real property.

The property is assessed under the

Farmland Assessment Act ("FAA") (U.C.A. § 59-2-501, et seq.). The
qualification of the property for assessment under the FAA is not
at issue.
challenge

The issue before this court involves appellant's
of the Commission's

Commission's

findings that

remand

orders

(1) appellant's

based

upon the

appraisal did not

conform to generally accepted practices and (2) there was insufficient evidence from which the fair market value of the property
could be ascertained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References to the record in this brief, paginated pursuant to
Rule 11(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, are denoted
"R.fl.

References to the transcript of the formal hearing are

denoted "T.ff.
1.

The tax year at issue is 1989. R. 5, Case No. 910183; R.

5, Case No. 910185; and R. 5, Case No. 910200.

The real property

which is the subject matter of this appeal (the "subject property")
consists of grazing land in Uintah County, Utah, owned by Utah
Shale Land & Minerals Corp ("Utah Shale"), Uintah Oil Association
("Uintah Oil"), and Utah Oil Shales, Inc. ("Utah Oil") (herein
collectively referred to as "appellant").
BTP10.002
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T. 7.

2.

The 1989 property tax was assessed by the Uintah County

Assessor, based upon a total value of $960,026.00 on property owned
by Utah Shale (R. 6, Case No. 910185); $101,948.00 on property
owned by Uintah Oil (R. 6, Case No. 910183), and $113,935.00 on
property owned by Utah Oil (R. 6, Case No. 910200).
3.

Appellant contested the value placed on the real property

and requested assessment, based upon a total value of $75,400.00 on
property owned by Utah Shale (R. 6, Case No. 910185); $8,100.00 on
property owned by Uintah Oil (R. 6, Case No. 910183), and $9,000.00
on property owned by Utah Oil (R. 6, Case No. 910200).
4.

The total value assigned by the Uintah County Assessor

was based on $50.00 per acre, while the total value claimed by the
appellant was based upon $4.00 per acre. R. 6, Case No. 910185; R.
6, Case No. 910183; and R. 6, Case No. 910200.
5.

The Uintah County Board of Equalization denied appel-

lant's request for reduction in the assessed value and appellant
appealed to the Commission.

A formal hearing was held on October

11, 1990, during which the Commission adduced evidence from the
respective parties. R. 5, Case No. 910183; R. 5, Case No. 910185;
and R. 5, Case No. 910200.
6.

On March 28, 1991, three separate orders were entered,

all of which remanded the dispute to the Uintah County Board of
Equalization for further proceedings to determine the fair market
BTP10.002
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value of the property.

R. 9, Case No. 910183; R. 9, Case No.

910185; and R. 9, Case No. 910200.
7.

Appeal was taken by all three taxpayers and the cases

have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant takes the position that the Commission's remand
orders are futile and that it will serve no useful purpose for the
Board of Equalization of Uintah County to take additional evidence.
Appellant argues that the Commission's decision is beyond the
limits of reason and rationality or, in the alternative, is
arbitrary and capricious.

Appellant further argues that the

evidence presented by its expert witness was uncontroverted and the
Commission erred in refusing to adjust the assessment based upon
the appraisal submitted.

Finally, appellant asserts that the

Commission's remand constitutes an unconstitutional

taking of

appellant's property without due process.
Uintah County agrees with the Commission's evaluation of the
evidence adduced at the formal hearing.

The County argues that

appellant will not be substantially prejudiced by the remand order
and that the Uintah County Board of Equalization has both the
authority and the responsibility of determining the actual fair
market value of the property as of January 1, 1989.
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A R G U M E N T
POINT I

THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION WAS NOT
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, IS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
THE REASONABLE AND RATIONAL TEST, AND SHOULD BE UPHELD
Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-17 provides that final agency
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings are appealed
immediately to Utah's appellate courts and sets forth the grounds
upon which relief may be granted by the appellate courts of Utah.
The standard of review applicable to final agency actions was
discussed by this court in Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus.
Com'n., 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988):
. . . There are essentially three standards
that determine the scope of judicial review of
agency action.
[Citations omitted.]
The
correction-of-error standard applies to agency
rulings on issues of law and extends no deference to agency rulings. An agency's findings
of fact, however, are accorded substantial
deference and will not be overturned if based
on substantial evidence, even if another
conclusion from the evidence is permissible.
[Footnote omitted.] As to questions of mixed
law and fact, a reviewing court usually accords an agency decision some deference, i.e.,
an agency's decision will not be set aside
unless the agency conclusion is unreasonable.
767 P.2d, at 526-527.
To prevail on appeal relative to the Commission's factual
findings, the County must show only that the Commission's conclusions were reasonable and based upon substantial evidence, even if
BTP10.002
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more than one conclusion from the evidence is possible. Johnson v.
Department of Employment Security, 782 P. 2d 965, 968 (Utah App.
1989).

The party challenging an agency's factual findings "must

marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, the Tax Commission's findings are not
supported by substantial evidence." First National Bank of Boston
v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1165
(Utah 1990).
Appellant apparently misapprehends the mandate contained in
First National Bank of Boston and has marshalled the evidence which
supports appellant's position, arguing that evidence was sufficient
to sustain appellant's burden of proof.

The evidence supporting

the Commission's findings is discussed below.
A.

The Commission's Finding with Respect to Market Rents is
Supported bv Substantial Evidence.
As noted above, appellant has, in effect, marshalled the

evidence which supports its own position.

To prevail under the

"substantial evidence" test discussed by this court in First
National Bank of Boston, supra. the appellant must marshall the
evidence supporting the Commission's factual findings to establish
that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
contrary is true.
Edward M. Bown, testifying for appellant (T. 8 ) , stated:
BTP10.002
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The

A

The lease rentals on these lands have
been rather nominal and we have followed
that policy from the three companies'
standpoint because we felt that by taking
less rental, there would be lighter use
of the lands, and we've tried to preserve
and protect those forage resources by not
requesting or seeking the highest rental
which we maybe could have obtained during
certain years.

Q

So, for conservation purposes, you have
not maximized the use of it as agricultural property, then?

A

No, sir, we really never have.

In its opening brief, appellant argues that the testimony of
its expert witness, Mr. Wiles, was uncontradicted. The contrary is
true.

Appellant's own witness, Mr. Bown, testified that the

rentals actually charged by the taxpayers/owners were, by design,
less than what could have been realized.
Appellant's argument also fails to consider the testimony of
Mr. Wiles concerning the AUM allocation.

On direct examination,

Mr. Wiles testified (T. 33):

BTP10.002

Q

In your examination of the BLM records,
did you find any information of the animal units per month?

A

Yes.

Q

And what was your finding?

A

They carried 5,307 AUM's allotted to the
oil shale allotment, and that would include the fee lands, state leases and the
BLM lands that are included in the allotment.
9

Q

Do you recall when that allocation had
been made?

A

No, I do not. Within several years prior
to •

Q

Based upon your own experience and your
observation of the property, would you
evaluate the BLM allocation as being
approximately correct or high or low?

A

(Inaudible) . . . the date in the BLM and
it appears from looking at the land condition of the BLM data that the BLM's
permit is actually close to double what
the carrying capacity might be,

Mr. Wiles also testified (T. 35):
Q

Were there any other documented sources
that you also reviewed?

A

The Soil Conservation Service or productive capacities and soil map information.
* * *

A

We reviewed the information in the state
grazing leases as to the AUM's allotted
to the land and the location of those
lands.

Q

What did that tell you?

A

It basically had the same amount of AUM's
allocated as the BLM did.

From the testimony of appellant's expert, the Commission had
evidence that the AUM allocation of the Soil Conservation Service,
the state grazing leases, and the Bureau of Land Management was
nearly twice what appellant's expert believed it should be and upon
which, presumably, his appraisal was based.
BTP10.002
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B.

The Commission's Determination That Appellant's Appraisal
Lacked Significant Data Elements is Supported by the Evidence,
Appellant argues that the appraisal submitted by its expert

witness was sufficient to establish the value of the property and
that no contradictory evidence was submitted.

As a preliminary

matter, it should be noted that, in making its decision, the
Commission may "rely upon its specialized knowledge and experience
in taxation and tax administration . . . ."
Code, R861-1-7A(L).

Utah Administrative

The Commission's finding that the comparable

sales contained in the appraisal submitted by appellant's expert
omits

important

elements

and

contains

adjustments

that

are

subjective and are difficult to support with reliable market data
is entitled to deference on review by this court.

As this court

noted in Xanthos v. Board of Adiustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d
1032 (Utah 1984):
This Court has consistently held that:
Due to the complexity of factors involved in
the matter of zoning, as in other fields where
courts review the actions of administrative
bodies, it should be assumed that those
charged with that responsibility (the Board)
have specialized knowledge in that field.
Accordingly, [administrative agencies] should
be allowed a comparatively wide latitude of
discretion; and their actions endowed with a
presumption of correctness and validity which
the courts should not interfere with unless it
is shown that there is no reasonable basis to
justify the action taken.
685 P.2d, at 1034, citing Cottonwood Heights Citizen Association v.
BTP10.002
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Board of Commissioners. 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979).
Appellant urges the court to disregard

the Commission's

finding that the appraisal lacked important factors from which its
accuracy could be ascertained and argues that the County presented
no contrary evidence. Both parties admit that sales of comparable
tracts of land are scarce. Appellant objected to the admission of
documents evidencing comparable

sales on the basis that the

property could not be adequately identified.

R. 63.

Appellant's assertion in its opening brief that all parties
agree no additional evidence is available is not entirely accurate.
The documentary evidence which the County withdrew, after appellant's

objection, was

withdrawn

by

reason

of Mr. Merkley's

representations that a degree of confidentiality would be accorded
the evidence.

On remand, the County would have an opportunity to

seek and possibly be relieved of the confidentiality and be in a
position to offer more substantive evidence in support of its
valuation. So, too, would appellant be afforded the opportunity to
revise

the

deficiencies

appraisals

submitted

by

its

expert

in its case and submit sufficient

"correct

the

evidence and

analyses for an appropriate and accurate value to be determined for
the subject property."

BTP10.002
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POINT II
THE COMMISSION'S RULING DOES NOT VIOLATE
PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES IN ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS
Appellant next argues that the Commission failed to follow its
own prescribed procedures, which appellant asserts required the
Commission to accept the evidence introduced by appellant.

As

discussed above, the evidence presented by appellant was, in some
significant respects, contradictory.

In any event, the procedure

to which appellant refers provides, in its entirety:
The Commission will accept uncontradicted
evidence, unless inherently improbable, as
being true. However, where such evidence is
solely and exclusively in the possession of
the one offering the same or where it would be
impossible or extremely difficult for the
adverse party to obtain rebuttal evidence, the
Commission reserves the right to give such
uncontradicted evidence only the weight deemed
fair, just, and proper.
Utah Administrative Code, R861-1-7A(0).
Because the evidence adduced by appellant was, in itself,
contradictory and in view of the acknowledged difficulty surrounding presentation of comparable sales data, the Commission was
justified in according the evidence less than dispositive weight.
POINT III
THE COMMISSION'S RULING IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONFISCATORY TAKING
OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
Appellant's final argument is replete with speculation and
BTP10.002
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borders on the hysterical•

Citing a number of general constitu-

tional concepts (i.e., the court has jurisdiction to grant relief
if an agency action is unconstitutional; due process finds its
roots in concepts of basic fairness of procedure; and all taxable
property should bear a just proportion of the burden of taxation),
appellant makes the incredible argument that the practical effect
of the Commission's remand for further proceedings is a confiscation of appellant's property.
Appellant asserts that it has been denied due process in that
the Commission's remand order sets "an impossibly high threshold
for proof necessary to rebut the Board's valuation. The Commission
demands

evidence

which, according

to

the

testimony

of

both

Petitioner and the Board, cannot be obtained."
The reality is that the Commission's remand order specifically
identifies the weaknesses in the presentations of both parties and
finds that, because of those weaknesses and omissions, it simply
has insufficient information upon which to arbitrate a determination of what the fair market value of the property is, as between
the value urged by the County and the value claimed by appellant.
That the Commission's ruling amounts to a deprivation of property
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution is so incredible as to be bizarre.

The argument is

merely inflammatory and appellant cites no applicable authority in
BTP10.002
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support of its position.
Appellant next argues that assessment of the property at $40
to $53 per acre effectively confiscates property determined to be
worth only $4.00 per acre.

This argument ignores both the letter

and the spirit of the Commission's ruling. No final determination
of value has been made.

The Commission has merely ruled that it

has insufficient information upon which to make a determination.
Appellant argues that, in the event the property ceases to
qualify for taxation under the Farmland Assessment Act, payment of
the roll-back taxes would be confiscatory.

The fact is that any

future change in the use of the property, such that the property
would no longer qualify for assessment under the FAA, is totally
irrelevant in the context of this appeal.
Appellant's

constitutional

arguments

can,

at

best,

be

characterized as premature. No final determination concerning the
value of the property has been made. Appellant and the County have
exactly the same opportunity to adduce additional evidence and
correct deficiencies in the case presented to the Commission on
October 11, 1990.

By no stretch of the imagination can appellant

be said to have been deprived of due process or to have been
subjected to unfair or discriminatory treatment by reason of the
Commission's order remanding this matter for further proceedings.

BTP10.002
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CONCLUSION
Despite its extensive expertise and experience in evaluating
appraisals and arbitrating disputes between local taxing authorities and taxpayers, the Commission was unable to determine the fair
market value of the subject property on the basis of the evidence
adduced

at

the

formal

hearing.

The

Commission, therefore,

specifically enumerated areas in the presentations of both parties
which required further evidence and remanded the case to the Board
of Equalization for further proceedings.
The Commission's decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious.
The evidence presented was contradictory and was insufficient to
enable the Commission to make a determination concerning the value
of the property.

The Commission's ruling was both reasonable and

rational and is supported by substantial evidence.
Appellant

has

Commission's ruling.

not been

substantially

prejudiced

by

the

No final determination concerning the value

of the subject property has been made.

Appellant retains all of

its statutory remedies and has the opportunity to develop additional

evidence

and

correct

the

deficiencies

identified

in the

Commission's ruling in further proceedings before the Uintah County
Board of Equalization.

Further, should appellant still believe

itself aggrieved upon conclusion of the proceedings in Uintah
County, it may again appeal the decision to the Tax Commission.
BTP10.002
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Deference

should

be

given

to

the

Commission's

factual

findings, challenged by appellant, and the Commission's remand for
further proceedings should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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